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RETIREMENT INCENTIVES IN THE TWENTY FIRST 
CENTURY: THE MOVE TOWARD EMPLOYER CONTROL OF 
THEADEA 
Judith A McMorrow* 
I. INTRODUCTION: RETIREMENT AND THE ADEA 
Retirement has become an increasingly important topic of 
public policy discussion in the United States, 1 as well as an 
accepted, and even cherished, goal for many American work-
ers.2 Consequently, it is not surprising that the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (ADEA)3 recognized, somewhat 
inartfully, the importance of retirement. When originally 
passed, the ADEA expressly provided an exemption for any 
bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, 
or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the pur-
poses of the ADEA 4 In 1986, Congress amended the ADEA to 
eliminate mandatory retirement, but made clear in its legis-
lative history that voluntary retirement was a valid employee 
choice.5 The interaction of retirement and the ADEA became 
* Associate Professor, Boston College Law SchooL Thank you to the students on 
the University of RichTTWnd Law Review for their vision in developing this sympo-
sium, Howard Eglit and Michael Harper for sharing their ideas, and Jackie Gardina 
for her excellent research assistance. 
1. See, e.g., John M. Cornman & Eric R. Kingson, Trends, Issues, Perspectives, 
and Values For the Aging of the Baby Boom Cohorts, 36 THE GERONTOLOGIST 15 
(1996). 
2. See WILLIAM GRAEBNER, A HISToRY OF RETIREMENT: THE MEANING AND FuNc-
TION OF AN AMERICAN INSTITUTION 1885-1978, at 269-70 (1980). 
3. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994). 
4. See Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended 29 U.S.C. § 
623(f)(2) (1994». See Judith A McMorrow, Retirement and Worker Choice: Incentives 
to Retire and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 B.C. L. REv. 347, 350 
(1988), for a history of this provision. The Older Worker Benefit Protection Act 
(OWBPA), Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990), (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 621-626 (1990 & Supp. 1996», amended the ADEA to distinguish between 
seniority systems and bona fide employee benefit plans, and altered the subterfuge 
language to make clear that Congress was disavowing restrictive Supreme Court 
interpretations of "subterfuge." See S. REP. No. 101-263 (1990), reprinted in 1990 
U.S.C.CAN. 1509, 1534-35. 
5. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 
795 
HeinOnline -- 31 U. Rich. L. Rev. 796 1997
796 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:795 
more explicit when Congress amended the Act again in 1990 to 
allow employers to observe the terms of "a voluntary early 
retirement plan consistent with" the purposes of the ADEA 6 
The 1990 amendments also expressly allowed waivers as part of 
retirement incentive plans.7 Consistent with this pattern of 
amendments under the ADEA, courts similarly have been solici-
tous to the interests of both employers and employees in pro-
viding retirement incentives, arguably to the extent of mini-
mizing other goals of the ADEA such as promoting employ-
ment.8 
While the ADEA clearly has a strong interest in the rela-
tionship between work and retirement, the ADEA is one small 
part of a mosaic of government regulation that shapes our 
nation's retirement policy. Social security, the nation's largest 
retirement program, covers ninety percent of all workers.9 Pri-
vate pensions have grown dramatically in recent years, with 
almost half of the population now covered by private pen-
sions.1o Meanwhile, the government has taken a much more 
active role in regulating these private pensions through the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).l1 Congress 
has recognized that "pension benefits are special under federal 
99-592, 100 Stat. 3342 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 622-624, 630-631) (stating that no 
such plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of an individual because 
of age); McMorrow, supra note 4, at 359-61. 
6. See OWBPA, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified as amended 
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-626 (1990 & Supp. 1996». The express protection of voluntary 
early retirement incentive plans is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2XB)(ii) (1994). See 
also S. REp. No. 101-263, at 28-29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1534. 
7. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (1994). 
8. See, e.g., Michael C. Harper, Age-Based Exit Incentives, Coercion, and the Pro-
spective Waiver of ADEA Rights: The Failure of the Older Workers Benefit Protection 
Act, 79 VA. L. REv. 1271, 1274 (1993); McMorrow, supra note 4, at 371-77. 
9. See Murray Gendell & Jacob S. Siegel, Trends in Retirement Age By Sex, 
1950-2005, MONTHLY LAB. REv., July 1992, at 22, 23. 
10. See id. 
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1994). 
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law.,,12 Through its regulation of both governmental and pri-
vate programs, the federal government has undertaken a domi-
nant role in shaping retirement policy in the United States.1S 
Compared with the scope of Social Security and ERISA regu-
lation, the ADEA is not a dominant vehicle for shaping federal 
retirement policy. Its focus is more limited. The ADEA's express 
goals are directed toward eliminating discrimination in employ-
ment, promoting the employment of older workers based on 
ability, and helping employers and workers meet the problems 
arising from the impact of age on employment.14 The ADEA 
was modeled after Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,15 
and was promoted using the language of civil and individual 
rights.1s While acknowledging the civil rights origins of the 
ADEA, we must not place the ADEA in too small a conceptual 
box by ignoring its important complementary role in shaping 
and reinforcing developments under Social Security and ERISA. 
In particular, the ADEA helps to shape how employers exercise 
the discretion given them under these other federal statutes.17 
The goal of this essay is to analyze whether the ADEA, as 
currently structured, can achieve its non-discrimination goals 
12. S. REP. No. 101-263 at 22-23 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CAN. 1509, 
1528 (emphasis omitted). The Senate Report identified some of the ways in which 
federal law recognizes the special status of pensions. Unlike severance (or other bene-
fits), pensions are protected through statutory vesting provisions; they are guaranteed 
by a federal insurance agency; and they are administered by means of a federal sys-
tem of reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary obligations. Congress, through ERISA, has 
expressed a commitment to regulate, protect, and underwrite the pension benefits of 
American workers. 
13. See GRAEBNER, supra note 2, at 267 (asserting that the federal government is 
"the foremost arbiter of retirement"). 
14. See 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1994). 
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). 
16. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994) ("prohibit[ing) arbitrary age discrimination in 
employment"); 136 CONGo REc. S13, 597 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1990) (statement of man-
agers accompanying the OWBPA citing agreement "to protect the civil rights of mil-
lions of older Americans" and "to protect older workers"); Howard Eglit, The Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act at Thirty: Where It's Been, Where It Is Today, 
Where It's Going, 31 U. RICH. L. REv. 579 (1997) (describing the origins of the 
ADEA). 
17. See, e.g., Houghton V. SIPCO, Inc., 38 F.3d 953, 959 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding 
no ADEA liability for announcing retirement benefit reductions permissible under 
ERISA, and no ADEA violation in offering older employees early retirement option 
not available to younger employees). 
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and also be an effective vehicle to complement retirement policy 
in the twenty-first century. To that end, this essay will examine 
two ideas. First, retirement incentives are likely to play an 
increasingly popular role as employers attempt to regulate re-
tirement patterns among their workers.1s Any retirement plan 
includes incentives, in the sense that the program is more at-
tractive when structured to give higher benefits. Retirement 
incentives as used in this article refers to circumstances in 
which employers provide additional benefits not included as a 
regular and permanent part of a pension plan.19 Retirement 
incentives promise to become more popular because of both the 
changing work and retirement patterns of American workers 
and the increasingly limited opportunities for employers to 
encourage retirement through traditional programs. Changes in 
Social Security and private pensions leave employers with re-
tirement incentives as one of the few ways in which to encour-
age the exit of workers from the work force. 
At the same time that employers are likely to find retirement 
incentives increasingly attractive, the ADEA, as interpreted and 
amended, is providing employers with increased control and 
autonomy in how to structure those incentives. In particular, 
the ADEA's affirmation of waivers in retirement incentives and 
the trend toward arbitration of ADEA statutory employment 
disputes both function to move retirement incentives into pri-
vate control of employers. This privatization has two public 
policy consequences. Employees are deterred from bringing 
arguably discriminatory conduct to the attention of the public 
policy bodies such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) and the courts, thereby diminishing the non-
discrimination goals of the ADEA. In addition, by allowing 
employers to screen their actions from public scrutiny, the 
ADEA becomes a less effective vehicle for complementing na-
tional retirement policy. 
18. See Olivia S. Mitchell & Anna M. Rappaport, Innovations and Trends in Pen· 
sion Plan Coverage, Type, and Design, in THE FuTuRE OF PENSIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 53, 55 (Ray Schmitt ed., 1993) (using pensions for "regulating retirement 
flows"). 
19. See Phyllis H. Mutschler, Early Retirement Incentive Programs (ERIPs): Mech-
anisms for Encouraging Early Retirement, in HANDBOOK ON EMPLOYMENT AND THE 
ELDERLY 182, 183 (William H. Crown ed., 1996). 
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II. CHANGES IN WORK AND RETIREMENT: ANTICIPATING 
THE TwENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
799 
Recent studies have demonstrated what we all may know 
intuitively, but which only has recently been empirically demon-
strated: financial incentives, particularly those from Social Se-
curity and private pensions, influence work decisions 
throughout our work life, and particularly in the decision of 
when and how to exit the work force.2o To better understand 
how those incentives affect the retirement decision, we need to 
have a fuller understanding of retirement. 
When Congress passed the ADEA in 1967, it operated under 
a single model of retirement in which the significant majority of 
workers went from full-time work to full-time retirement.21 
This simple model of either full-time work or full-time retire-
ment, however, is not accurate for many older workers. We 
have an increasing awareness of "new retirement" in which 
workers engage in "productive aging."22 This takes the form of 
increasing numbers of workers continuing to work in some form 
after ostensibly retiring. Some workers shift from career jobs to 
full- or part-time post-career jobs.23 These post-career "bridge" 
jobs often involve fewer hours, greater flexibility and. less 
stress.24 Others switch to related work. For example, a survey 
of law professors who retired between 1983 and 1988 showed 
that approximately seventeen percent continued full-time work 
for compensation, and over half continued to work at least part-
time for compensation after retiring from their tenured faculty 
positions.25 Their postretirement activities included teaching, 
20. See JOSEPH F. QUINN ET AL., PASSING THE TORCH: THE INFLUENCE OF Eco-
NOllflC INCENTIVES ON WORK AND RETIREMENT 234-38 (1990). 
21. See id. at 240. 
22. See, PRODUCTIVE AGING: ENHANCING VITALITY IN LATER LIFE (R. Butler & H. 
Gleason eds., 1985); Laura Pappano, The New Retirement: Six Ways to Make the Most 
of Life After Work, B. GLOBE MAG., Feb. 16, 1997, at 16 •. 
23. See Christopher J. Ruhm, Historical Trends in the Employment and Labor 
Force Participation of Older Americans, in HANDBOOK ON EMPLOYMENT AND THE EL-
DERLY 81, 98 <William H. Crown ed., 1996); John R. Besl & Balkrishna D. Kale, Old-
er Workers in the 21st Century: Active and Educated, A Case Study, MONTHLY LAB. 
REv., June 1996, at 18, 27. 
24. See Ruhm, supra note 23, at 98. 
25. See Judith A. McMorrow & Anthony R. Baldwin, Life After Law School: On 
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consulting, arbitration, and practice.26 These findings are con-
sistent with other studies, which have demonstrated that from 
one-third to one-half of men partially retire, with an average 
continued-work-life of over five years.27 Although women have 
been less studied, preliminary data indicates that substantial 
numbers of women are also engaging in partial retirement.28 
One study found that a quarter of workers engaged in "reverse 
retirement" by reentering the work force at some point during 
the eight years after initially retiring.29 This pattern of engag-
ing in some form of work as a transition from full-time work to 
full-time retirement means that many workers will continue to 
supplement their income during this transition time. It makes 
moving out of the full-time career job more affordable for many 
workers, and provides a larger pool of part-time workers to 
replace the retirees. 30 This, in turn, may make retirement in-
centives more attr~ctive to employers. 
This pattern of transitional work is likely to become more 
pronounced in the future. When Congress passed the ADEA, 
the employment rates among older workers (primarily men) had 
declined steadily over the preceding decades.31 The impact of 
these shifts is magnified as the U.S. population ages. Both 
scholars and pop culture have followed the baby boomers into 
middle age and anticipate their increasing numbers in retire-
ment.32 These changes are more than academic. Politicians, 
economists, pension planners, gerontologists, and the stock 
market are all predicting how the aging of our population will 
impact our economy, our political life, our culture, and our 
Being a Retired Law Professor, 41 J. LEGAL Enuc. 407, 415-16 (1991). 
26. See id. at 415. 
27. See Ruhm, supra note 23, at 98. 
28. See QUINN ET AL., supra note 20, at 26. Part-time work before retirement was 
found to be more common for women than for men. See id. 
29. See Ruhm, supra note 23, at 98. 
30. But see Eglit, supra note 16, at 684-89 (discussing factors that may serve as 
disincentives to hiring older workers). 
31. See id. at 664-68. This fairly steady decrease in the retirement age may be 
stabilizing, although demographers and economists who closely monitor the trends 
draw varying conclusions about shifts in the employment rates. See Besl & Kale, 
supra note 23, at 19. 
32. See generally ERIC KINGSON, THE DIVERSITY OF THE BABY BQOM GENERATION: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THEm RETIREMENT YEARS (1992); Besl & Kale, supra note 23; 
Cornman & Kingson, supra note 1. 
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individual savings plans. The possible impact of these changes 
is complex. Over time, a higher percentage of the work force 
will be older, and often paid more than younger employees. 
This may encourage employers to consider retirement incen-
tives, particularly when many of these retirees would consider 
part-time participation. On the other hand, the decreased pool 
of younger workers may discourage employers from offering 
incentives because the more senior workers are simply too valu-
able to the employer. 
Other pressures are likely to encourage older workers to 
continue working in some form. Concerns about health care 
costs and allocations are likely to affect the retirement decisions 
of many workers. If the employee receives health insurance 
through their employer, the employee must make plans to ob-
tain insurance coverage until Medicare becomes available at age 
sixty-five. Even after age sixty-five, Medicare coverage is incom-
plete and, increasingly, workers need to consider health insur-
ance availability and cost in retirement.33 If affordable health 
care is not available, workers will have to remain in the work 
force if they are able. 
The newer, older workers are also more educated than the 
oldest generation, and this higher education rate may encour-
age workers to remain in the work force longer than their par-
ents.34 Past retirement patterns indicate that workers with 
more schooling are more likely to continue working past fifty-
five.35 By the year 2020, college graduates will outnumber high 
school dropouts (the least educated group of workers) by three 
to one.3S This tendency to work longer may be due, in part, to 
the fact that more educated workers tend to earn higher in-
comes, which creates a financial incentive to continue 
working.37 
This pattern of continued work may be more significant for 
older women than older men. Since women live longer than 
33. See KINGSON, supra note 32, ·at 45-48. 
34. See Besl & Kale, supra note 23, at 18. 
35. See id. at 20. 
36. See id. at 22. 
37. See id. at 19. 
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men and are participating in the work force at a greater rate 
than in the past, there is a likelihood of continued participation 
of women in the work force. Rising divorce rates may also af-
fect the availability of pensions, and therefore the affordability 
of retirement, particularly for women.38 Changing race and 
ethnic diversity in the population may also shape retirement 
patterns. Currently, older black women have the highest rate of 
labor force participation among workers fifty-five and older.39 
This may reflect lower wages, which make traditional retire-
ment simply unaffordable. If wage disparities drop, the effect of 
race on the work participation rate of older workers may 
change. 
Rising college costs are also reshaping how employees use 
their long-term savings. AB American families delay marriage 
and childbirth, these workers will face significant college costs 
at the very time that they would traditionally be considering 
retirement.40 Because families are smaller, workers also have a 
smaller family network for support in retirement.41 
Taken as whole, these demographic changes are likely to 
mean that a larger number of workers will be inclined to con-
tinue in the work force. Government regulation increasingly 
encourages, or at least has removed many disincentives to, con-
tinued work by older people.42 This is implemented through a 
series of legislative changes.43 The 1983 Amendments to the 
Social Security Act are phasing in a variety of changes to re-
duce work disincentives. The retirement age at which a worker 
will receive full benefits will slowly increase from sixty-five to 
sixty-seven (to be completed by 2027).44 The Amendments will 
eventually phase in an increase in the early retirement penalty 
and will slightly increase the delayed retirement credit given to 
38. See id. at 26. 
39. See id. at 24. 
40. See KINGSON, supra note 32, at 9-11 (noting that the median age for a first 
marriage has increased by more than three years since the mid-1950s, and that baby 
boomers have postponed childbirth). 
41. See id. at 11. 
42. See Barry L. Friedman, Social Security Wealth and Labor Supply Incentives, 
in HANDBOOK ON EMPLOYMENT AND THE ELDERLY 144 (William H. Crown ed., 1996). 
43. See QUINN ET AL., supra note 20, at 193. 
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(1) (1994). 
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workers who continue to work after the normal retirement 
age.45 The 1986 amendments to the ADEA eliminated manda-
tory retirement for all but a small group of workers.46 The 
ADEA now also prohibits employers from reducing or eliminat-
ing pension benefit accruals because of age.47 
Trends in private pension plans also are reducing 
disincentives to continue working. Defined benefit plans, those 
that guarantee a certain payment each month, were at one 
time the most common form of pension plans.46 Defined benefit 
plans typically contain work disincentives by setting maximum 
pension benefits and limiting the years of service that count 
toward the pension. Older, long-term employees may have ac-
crued the maximum available pension after thirty years, while 
still in their fifties. Employers, however, increasingly favor 
defined contribution plans/9 in which the employer and em-
ployee contribute to the plan and the funds are invested until 
the employee reaches retirement age.50 Unlike defined benefit 
plans, which are often based wholly on employer contributions, 
defined contribution plans rely primarily on the employee's own 
contributions from pre-tax earned income, the amount of which 
is based largely on the employee's farsightedness and ability to 
save.51 Employees have to earn sufficient income in order to 
devote some of the income to future planning. Furthermore, 
this change in pension funding is occurring at the same time 
that personal savings rates have declined.52 Because defined 
contribution plans are based on a retirement investment ac-
count, which belongs to the employee, the employer has fewer 
45. See id.; see generally Friedman, supra note 42, at 147. 
46. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 
99-592, 100 Stat. 3342 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 622-624, 630-631). 
47. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(i)(1)(A) (1994); see also Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 116 S. 
Ct. 1783 (1996) (holding that ERISA does not prohibit conditioning payment of in-
creased pension benefits on retiree's release of employment-related claims, and that 
amendments to ERISA and ADEA that prohibit age-based cessation or reduction of 
benefit accruals do not apply retroactively). 
48. See John A Turner & Tabitha Doescher, Pensions and Retirement, in HAND-
BOOK ON EMPLOYMENT AND THE ELDERLY 165, 180 (William H. Crown ed., 1996). 
49. See QUINN ET AL., supra note 20, at 247. 
50. See Mitchell & Rappaport, supra note 18, at 56. 
51. See id. at 57. 
52. See Besl & Kale, supra note 23, at 18. 
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opportunities to make changes in the retirement account that 
are likely to encourage retirement. 53 Early retirement subsidies 
and postretirement benefit increases are usually not possible 
under defined contribution plans. 54 
These changing social forces and retirement patterns will 
inevitably affect how employers use retirement incentives. Larg-
er economic forces are likely to encourage workers to continue 
work. The drop in the number of defined benefit plans reduces 
the employer's ability to use standard pension plan changes as 
a way to encourage retirement. Yet some employers may still 
consider replacing full-time career employees with part-time 
and lower cost employees (including other semi-retirees). All of 
these factors are likely to increase the role of retirement incen-
tives as one of the few vehicles for employers to control the 
number of older workers in their work force. 
Against this backdrop of changing retirement patterns, we 
have seen a move toward unmonitored employer control of 
retirement incentives under ADEA Two important develop-
ments have pushed this trend forward: the affirmation of waiv-
ers under the ADEA for retirement and exit incentives (coupled 
with changes in the law that increase plaintiffs burden in es-
tablishing an ADEA case), and the rise of arbitration and other 
forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) as forums for 
resolving legal challenges to retirement incentives. These chang-
es have made it harder to assess the legal impact of the 
employer's conduct. They shield much of the employer's activi-
ties from close legal scrutiny. Consequently, we need to exam-
ine these developments closely. 
III. THE MOVEMENT TOWARD UNMONITORED EMPLOYER 
CONTROL OF RETIREMENT INCENTIVES 
A Retirement Incentives and Exit Programs: Waiver & Choice 
AB retirement incentive programs became popular in the 
1980s, employers increasingly used waivers or releases from 
53. See Turner & Doescher, supra note 48, at 180. 
54. See Mitchell & Rappaport, supra note 18, at 60. 
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liability as a condition to granting the additional benefits. 55 
While waivers and releases were initially challenged under the 
ADEA, courts generally rejected an absolute prohibition of waiv-
ers and releases, as long as they were knowing and volun-
tary.56 The standards used to evaluate voluntariness varied 
among the courts, however, and the 1990 amendments to the 
ADEA, through the Older Worker Benefit Protection Act 
(OWBPA), expressly addressed the conditions under which re-
leases are valid under the ADEA. 57 
To better understand waivers, it is helpful to identify com-
mon plan designs and methods of implementation. Retirement 
and exit incentives can be designed in several ways. Sometimes 
the incentive is structured as an exit incentive that is not ex-
pressly tied to retirement. For example, an employer may offer 
a lump sum payment, a payment based on years of service 
($1000 for each year of employment), or a percentage of salary, 
which mayor may not be tied to retirement.56 Some incentives 
are structured as pure retirement incentives, offering enhanced 
pension-related benefits to employees near retirement age, such 
as adding years of service to the pension formula or providing 
insurance benefits until the employee is eligible for Medicare.59 
Both systems are likely to impact employees in the protected 
class. 
These retirement and exit incentives can occur via individual 
or group offers. In the first form, an employer may individually 
negotiate with a single employee to give the employee financial 
incentives in return for the employee's resignation. The OWBPA 
sets out seven criteria for a valid waiver between an individual 
55. See S. REP. No. 101-263, at 26-27, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CAN. 1532 
("Since the 1978 amendments to the ADEA, there has been a dramatic rise in the 
number of early retirement incentive programs used by employers."); 1 HOWARD C. 
EGLlT, AGE DISCRIMINATION § 5.63 (2d ed. 1994). 
56. See EGLlT, supra note 55, § 5.64. 
57. See generally OWBPA, Pub. L. No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-626 (1990 & Supp. 1996». The OWBPA uses the term 
release, but for purposes of this discussion release is functionally the same as a waiv-
er. Both function to preclude the employee from pursuing legal action against the 
employer under the ADEA because of a contractual agreement. 
58. See S. REP. No. 101-263, 27-28 at (describing these programs as lawful early 
retirement incentives). 
59. See Harper, supra note 8. 
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employee and the employer: (1) the waiver must be in under-
standable language; (2) the waiver must specifically refer to 
ADEA rights and claims; (3) the waiver cannot include claims 
after the date of the document (i.e., no prospective waiver); (4) 
the waiver must include consideration; (5) the employee must 
be advised in writing to consult an attorney; (6) the employee 
must be given twenty-one days to consider the offer; and, (7) 
the employee must be given a seven-day revocation period.60 
Since this involves, at least in theory, a one-on-one negotiation, 
the OWBPA does not require the employer to provide data 
about what other employees might have received. Sometimes 
the employer and employee engage in meaningful negotiations. 
In other circumstances, the employer has a standard offer that 
generally does not vary. 
These seven criteria demonstrate that Congress views incen-
tives and waivers as a contract, which must conform to stan-
dard contract provisions. Congress did elect to give some addi-
tional protections, such as time to consider the offer and a 
revocation period.61 While a positive step, these protections 
only put retirement incentives on a par with purchasing a time-
share in many jurisdictions.62 
In many instances employers do not engage in individual 
negotiations, but instead offer an incentive package to a group 
of employees. Group retirement and exit incentives have become 
very popular in recent years as a method of implementing the 
euphemistic "downsizing." If a waiver is offered as part of a 
group program, the OWBPA requires employers to disclose the 
program's eligibility criteria, time limits, the job titles and ages 
of individuals eligible or selected for the program, and the ages 
of all individuals in the same job class or unit who are not 
eligible or selected.63 The OWBPA also requires that employers 
provide the employees forty-five days to consider the agree-
60. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1) (Supp. 1996). 
61. See, e.g., Mary Lou Savage, et al., Time Share Regulation: The Wisconsin 
Model, 77 MARQ. L. REv. 719, 740 (1994) (discussing regulation of selling practices, 
including a five-day revocation period). 
62. See id. 
63. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(I)(H) (1994). 
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ment.64 In theory, this additional information about eligibility 
criteria and similarly situated employees gives the offeree an 
opportunity to determine both whether he or she is being treat-
ed fairly vis-a-vis the larger group, and whether the group offer 
has a discriminatory impact. 
These waiver/release provisions evolved from the laudable 
goal of clarifying the legal standard for evaluating waivers and 
preventing abuses in providing retirement incentives. But set-
ting out waiver provisions in detail also establishes a clear road 
map to employers. To minimize liability, a risk-adverse employ-
er will establish a form waiver. If an employer complies with 
the minimum requirements of the ADEA by following this road 
map, the employer is likely to be free of liability once the em-
ployee signs the waiver and the revocation period has passed.65 
While predictability is a very positive value in most circum-
stances, here we are not predicting lawful behavior, but only 
freedom from liability. Employers could put together incentives 
that otherwise would violate the ADEA, but offer attractive 
payments or buyouts under the shadow of layoffs. Risk-adverse 
employees are likely to take the offer. The employer's underly-
ing conduct is shielded from public review. 
In addition, while the terms of the agreement and the waiver 
might be subject to "negotiation," realistically that negotiation 
is only open to the more highly compensated employees. Again, 
if an employer complies with the OWBP A, courts are much less 
likely to conclude that the waiver was involuntary. The chal-
lenges to the employer's plans will be likely dismissed at sum-
mary judgment based on the employee's waiver. 
64. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(f)(1){F)(ii) (1994). 
65. See, e.g., Blakeney v. Lomas Info. Sys., 65 F.3d 482, 484 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 116 S. Ct. 1042 (1996) (holding that a waiver is knowing and voluntary if it 
complies with statutory requirements of OWBPA; employer's failure to comply with 
OWBPA creates voidable contract that is ratified by employee's retention of severance 
pay); Hodge v. New York College, 940 F. Supp. 579, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). But see 
Anderson v. Lifeco Servo Corp., 881 F. Supp. 1500, 1503-04 (D. Col. 1995) (finding 
that a release conformed to the minimum requirements of § 626(0 and also satisfied 
the additional requirement that it was knowing and voluntary, because of employee's 
constructive and perhaps actual knowledge, and because of negotiation with employ-
er). 
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For group offers, the waiver provisions try to provide employ-
ees with information that might allow a knowledgeable attorney 
to determine if a prima facie case of age discrimination is pres-
ent by the choice of who is offered the plan. This information is 
largely form over substance. Employers are understandably 
heartened-and employees dismayed-by the increasingly high 
standard for proving intentional discrimination under federal 
non-discrimination statutes, including the ADEA 66 An employ-
ee who sees a pattern of disparate impact on older workers also 
has an increasingly thin legal theory that can only be pursued 
at significant legal risk.67 Given the current legal climate, an 
employee faces an extraordinarily hard choice in giving up a 
sum certain for proceeding in an increasingly skeptical judicial 
forum. In addition, the decision to retire is traumatic and many 
employees will simply go with the path of least resistance be-
cause they cannot focus on making a major life choice in twen-
ty-one to forty-five days. These concerns cause some commenta-
tors to argue that the waiver provisions function more like a 
prospective waiver than a settlement of claims.68 
Mr. Spink's experience is illustrative.69 Mr. Spink was reem-
ployed by Lockheed Corporation in 1979. He declined a retire-
ment incentive offer, and refused to sign a waiver because the 
company made clear that he and similarly situated employees 
would not receive pension credit for their earlier service. Mr. 
Spink sued. The Supreme Court agreed with the employer that 
the 1986 changes in the law that prohibited age discrimination 
in benefit accruals did not apply retroactively.70 Mr. Spink had 
66. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 615 (1993) (firing an employee 
to prevent vesting in a pension plan, although illegal under ERISA, is not alone a 
violation of the ADEA); Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of Circumstantial Proof in Em-
ployment Discrimination Litigation: St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext, and the 
"Personality" Excuse, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. (forthcoming July 1997); Roger 
J. Johns, Jr., Proving Pretext and Willfulness in Age Discrimination Cases after Hazen 
Paper Company v. Biggens, 45 LAB. L. J. 221 (1994). 
67. See Hazen, 507 U.S. at 611; Mack A. Player, Wards Cove Packing or Not 
Wards Cove Packing? That is Not the Question: Some Thoughts on Impact Analysis 
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 31 U. RICH. L. REv. 819 (1997). 
68. See, e.g., Harper, supra note 8. 
69. See Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, 116 S. Ct. 1783 (1996). 
70. See id. at 1786. ERISA does not prohibit conditioning payment of increased 
pension benefits on retiree's release of employment-related claims. See id. at 1787. 
The amendments to ERISA and ADEA that prohibit age-based cessation or reduction 
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to incur considerable financial risk-and he lost-just to bring 
the policy issue to a public forum. If we were talking about two 
corporate entities, we might feel more comfortable with allocat-
ing litigation risks in this way. But with the ADEA, we typi-
cally have an individual employee challenging a much larger 
corporate entity. 
Even if we dismiss these concerns as part of many hard 
choices against which the law cannot guard, we still have a 
system in place that functionally encourages employers to 
shield plans from later public scrutiny through waivers. While 
the understaffed EEOC still has the right to challenge such 
plans, employees waive any compensation if a violation is 
found.7l This reduces the employee's incentive to bring the de-
tails of the plan to a public forum. In addition, many courts 
have held that employees must give back the retirement incen-
tive before they are allowed to challenge it in court (the ten-
der/ratification doctrine).72 Liberal use of waivers promises to 
impede the non;discrimination goals of the ADEA. 
Waivers also impede the ability of the ADEA to complement 
our national retirement policies. As noted above, federal law 
has removed many disincentives to continued work. As our 
population ages, we will see a rise in the number of retired 
workers whose Social Security must be funded in part by the 
smaller number of full-time workers. Just as Social Security 
will slowly increase the eligibility age for benefits, Congress 
may need to take more aggressive action to encourage workers 
to remain in the work force. For example, Congress could con-
clude that the stated ADEA purpose of promoting employment 
of older workers based on ability is more important than allow-
ing employers to meet the problems arising from the impact of 
age on employment through retirement incentives.73 Congress 
of benefit accruals do not apply retroactively. See id. 
71. See, e.g., Coventry v. United States Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 524 (3d Cir. 
1988). 
72. See, e.g., Jill R. Bodensteiner, Note, Post-OWBPA Developments in the Law 
Regarding Waivers to ADEA Claims, 46 WASH. U_ J. URB. & CONTE1IP. L. 225 (1994) 
(describing history of waivers under the ADEA and developing conflict on the validity 
of the tender/ratification doctrine). 
73. See 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1996) (citing two of the stated purposes of the ADEA); 
see also Mutschler, supra note 19, at 192-93 ("Inducing workers to leave their jobs 
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may need to impose increased restrictions on retirement incen-
tives to give greater assurance that retirement is truly volun-
tary. With waivers, questionable retirement incentives are much 
less likely to be reviewed in court, impeding the flow of infor-
mation about what employers are doing and how employees are 
reacting to retirement incentives. 
B. Dispute Resolution: Forum and Choice 
A second, independent development under the ADEA promis-
es to push retirement incentives further from public scrutiny. 
Over the last fifteen years, the United States Supreme Court 
has enthusiastically endorsed arbitration of commercial disputes 
as an alternative to traditional court-based litigation.74 The 
Supreme Court's primary vehicle for encouraging arbitration 
has been the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act, which has been the 
subject of a series of very favorable opinions.75 These favorable 
interpretations were confined initially to more traditional com-
mercial settings, such as the relationship between franchisees 
and the arbitrability of anti-trust issues in disputes between 
foreign and domestic corporations.76 Federal employment dis-
crimination claims had been viewed as beyond the scope of 
mandatory arbitration in large measure due to the Supreme 
Court's decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.77 In a 
unanimous decision, the Court held in Alexander that the em-
ployee was entitled to trial de novo on his race discrimination 
complaint under Title VII, even though he had submitted his 
discharge to final arbitration under a non-discrimination clause 
prior to their planned date of retirement frequently curtails individual savings or may 
cause retirees to withdraw funds sooner than they had planned. Clearly, in these 
instances, what is good for GM is not good for the nation."). 
74. See Stephen L. Hayford, Commercial Arbitration in the Supreme Court 1983-
1995: A Sea Change, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1 (1996) (finding that between 1983 
and 1995 the Supreme Court issued 13 opinions under the Federal Arbitration Act 
strongly embracing arbitration of commercial disputes). 
75. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994). 
76. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614 (1984) (discussing the arbitration of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act between Japa-
nese and Puerto Rican corporations); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) 
(discussing the arbitration of statutory rights under the California Franchise Invest-
ment law). 
77. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
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of a collective bargaining agreement. The Court expressly dis-
tinguished between contractual disputes and resolution of rights 
created under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.78 
The distinction between business contractual disputes and 
federal statutory employment disputes was significantly eroded 
in 1991 when the Supreme Court changed the operating pre-
sumption about the arbitrability of statutory employment dis-
crimination claims. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
COrp./9 the Supreme Court concluded that the ADEA does not 
prevent ADEA claims from being subject to mandatory arbitra-
tion.80 In Gilmer, the employee signed a New York Stock Ex-
change securities representative application, which contained a 
clause requiring arbitration of any controversy arising out of 
the employment or termination of the employment. Mr. Gilmer 
was discharged at age sixty-two and filed the requisite age dis-
crimination complaint with the EEOC. The Supreme Court held 
that statutory claims, such as Mr. Gilmer's ADEA claim, may 
be subject to mandatory arbitration agreements under the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act.81 Only a clear intent from the ADEA to 
preclude arbitration would be sufficient to overcome the strong 
federal policy toward arbitration.82 Gilmer drew expressly on 
the line of cases in which the Court has actively supported 
moving statutory causes of action into a private forum.83 More 
importantly, the Court expressly distinguished Alexander as 
reflecting a "'mistrust of the arbitral process'" that has been 
undermined by more recent decisions.84 
Alternatives to litigation, such as arbitration, have tremen-
dous virtues that are worthy of being implemented as federal 
78. See id. at 56 (".Arbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution of con-
tractual disputes, make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final 
resolution of rights created by Title Vll"). 
79. See id. at 35. 
80. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
81. See id. at 35. 
82. See id. at 26. 
83. See Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1997 
SUP. CT. REv. 331, 369-71 (forthcoming) (on file with author); Hayford, supra note 74, 
at 29-32. 
84. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 34 (quoting ShearsonlAmerican Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 
482 U.S. 220, 231-32 (1987». 
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policy.85 Arbitration, in general, has simpler procedures that 
are generally more accessible and understandable to employees. 
Consequently, they are usually quicker and less expensive to 
pursue for both employers and employees.86 Arbitration often 
allows for more creative remedies, such as outplacement.87 In 
many cases employees with lower wages cannot afford counsel 
to pursue statutory claims. Often the damages are so small 
that lawyers are unwilling to take the case on contingency. AB 
the Supreme Court noted in Gilmer, the ADEA contains a pro-
vision to encourage informal resolution of disputes, which in-
volves a voluntary resolution of the claim under the auspices of 
the EEOC.88 We can, however, embrace these many advan-
tages of alternative dispute resolution, including mediation, 
without endorsing wholesale transfer of employment disputes to 
mandatory arbitration. Imposing mandatory arbitration for 
statutory employment discrimination claims based on a pre-
employment agreement (or a statement in an employee hand-
book for an employee-at-will) is much more problematic than 
the Supreme Court acknowledges. 
AB a practical matter, only the very highest-level employees 
have individually negotiated employment agreements. In most 
cases, employees are either handed a standard agreement (like 
Mr. Gilmer as a securities representative) or are given an em-
ployment manual and told that these are the terms and condi-
tions of employment, should the employee decide to work for 
the employer. In the employment context, the mandatory arbi-
tration clauses often look like a contract of adhesion. We do not 
call them such because the Supreme Court has viewed arbitra-
tion over the last fifteen years as a content-neutral act. The 
Court gave lip service in Gilmer to the notion that an agree-
ment to arbitrate might have "resulted from the sort of fraud or 
overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds" for 
a contract revocation.89 But agreements that involve mere un-
85. See generally Andrew w. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 
94 YALE L.J. 1660 (1985). 
86. See Stephen W. Skrainka, The Utility of Arbitration Agreements in Employ-
ment Manuals and Collective Bargaining Agreements for Resolving Civil Rights, Age 
and ADA Claims, 37 ST. Loms U. L.J. 985, 992-93 (1993). 
87. See id. at 991. 
88. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 29. 
89. [d. at 33 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 
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equal bargaining power were not seen as problematic and the 
Court essentially placed the take-it-or-Ieave-it agreements be-
tween employers and employees "on the same footing as other 
contracts. "go 
In addition, unlike labor or large commercial arbitration, the 
employer is likely to be the dominant repeat player and the 
employee a one-time participant in arbitration. This lends itself, 
at least in theory, to a hidden preference for the interests, of 
the repeat players, who will have the ability to hire the arbitra-
tor again.91 Unfortunately, unlike the courts, there is no cen-
tralized repository of data that allows us to monitor the number 
of cases going to employment arbitration, although it appears 
that the numbers are still quite small.92 But preliminary stud-
ies of the available data show interesting patterns emerging. It 
appears that employees who bring claims typical of executive-
level managers (e.g., breach of express contract) fare well in 
arbitration and win even more often than employers. The small 
sampling to date makes it unclear whether lower-level, non-
executive employees fare as well in arbitration. These are typi-
cally the employees most in need of a strong forum to help 
equalize the power relationship between employers and employ-
ees.93 It is too soon to make adverse judgments, however, since 
these non-executive workers are the same employees who tend 
to fare poorly in traditional litigation as well.94 But the con-
cern for repeat player preference in arbitration is very much a 
live issue. 
The ADEA, and other statutory claims, also contain express 
authorization for suit in federal court. This implicitly gives 
473 U.S. 614, 627 (1984». 
90. [d. at 33 (noting there was no indication that Gilmer, "an experienced busi-
nessman, was coerced or defrauded into agreeing to the arbitration clause • . . . This 
claim of unequal bargaining power is best left for resolution in specific cases."). 
91. See Lisa B. Bingham, Emerging Due Process Concerns in Employment Arbitra-
tion: A Look at Actual Cases, 47 LAB. L.J. 108 (1996) (discussing empirical study of 
employment cases arbitrated by the American Arbitration Association in 1993, com-
paring outcomes under the older commercial rules and the new Employment Dispute 
Resolution Rules). 
92. See id. at 112-13. 
93. See id. at 115-16. 
94. See Skrainka, supra note 86, at 998-99. 
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litigants the ability to use the procedural powers of the courts 
to develop evidence. In contrast, the Federal Arbitration Act 
does not contain clear provisions for discovery (beyond subpoena 
power), or for judicial review of the substantive interpretation 
of employment discrimination law.95 The very attributes that 
tend to make arbitration quicker and cheaper (fewer procedural 
rules, less discovery, lower evidentiary standards) also open the 
door for procedural abuses.96 Consistent with its other arbitra-
tion opinions, the Supreme Court in Gilmer rejected challenges 
to procedural differences between the court and arbitral forums 
as a basis for precluding arbitration.97 The Court was unclear 
what minimum standards for fairness would be required for a 
valid arbitration. 
Not only did the original ADEA not anticipate wholesale 
mandatory arbitration based often on unnegotiated take-it-or-
leave-it employer requirements, the Federal Arbitration Act 
(FAA) was not passed with statutory employment discrimina-
tion claims in mind. The FAA was passed in 1925 and could 
not have anticipated arbitrators interpreting a vast array of 
statutory employment discrimination law and sets up no train-
ing criteria for doing so. Even more troublesome, the Supreme 
Court's interpretation of the FAA has essentially pre-empted 
the ability of most state law to equalize the bargaining power 
between the parties.98 
Gilmer does not provide strong or clear legal constraints on 
what employers can incorporate into their alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) procedures, such as limiting discovery, limiting 
the time for bringing an arbitration request, and limiting the 
use of counsel. Courts may impose some limits in extreme cas-
es,99 but given the strong policy toward arbitration, there is no 
95. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994); see also Carrington & Haagen, supra note 83, at 
347. 
96. See Ronald Turner, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination 
Claims With Special Reference to the Three A's-Access, Adjudication, and Acceptabili-
ty, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 231, 235-36 (1996). 
97. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30-32 (1991). 
98. See Carrington & Haagen, supra note 83, at 379-91. 
99. See, e.g., Heurtebise v. Reliable Bus. Computers, 550 N.W.2d 243, 247 (Mich. 
1996) (holding employee handbook did not create enforceable arbitration agreement for 
employee's gender discrimination claim because employer did not intend to be bound 
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assurance that courts will impose significant procedural require-
ments on arbitration. 100 
In the absence of meaningful public guidance, some of the 
ADR and labor groups in the private sector have begun to ad-
dress the unfairness inherent in the employer control over the 
arbitration process. Representatives of several of the major 
ADR providers (American Arbitration Association, Endispute, 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, Society of Profes-
sionals in Dispute Resolution, National Academy of Arbitrators) 
and others with an interest in employer-employee relations 
(ABA, International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, ACLU, 
National Employment Lawyers Association) created a Task 
Force which developed a "Due Process Protocol" as a guideline 
for fair employment arbitration proceedings.10l 
The Task Force disagreed on many policy issues concerning 
the timing of an agreement to mediate and/or arbitrate a stat-
utory dispute. They did agree on several important procedural 
issues. Employees should have the right to be represented by a 
spokesperson of their own choosing, and they should have ac-
cess to all information reasonably relevant to mediation or 
arbitration of their claims.lo2 Mediators and arbitrators should 
have the skills to conduct the hearings and a knowledge of the 
statutory issues; they should be impartial, preferably selected 
from a roster determined on a non-discriminatory basis.lo3 The 
mediator or arbitrator "has a duty to disclose any relationship 
which might reasonably constitute or be perceived as a conflict 
of interest."l04 Perhaps most importantly, the mediators and 
arbitrators "should reject cases if they believe the procedures 
lack requisite due process."105 Consistent with this Due Pro-
by any provision in handbook). 
100. See, e.g., Continental Airlines v. Mason, No. 95-55343, 1996 WL 341758 (9th 
Cir. June 19, 1996) (compelling arbitration under employee handbook of sex discrimi-
nation, wrongful termination, and infliction of emotional distress claims; an arbitra-
tion procedure that does not provide for discovery or legal counsel is not uncon-
scionable). 
101. See Binghanl, supra note 91, app. at 122. 
102. Id. 
103. See id. at 123-24. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 124. 
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cess Protocol, the American Arbitration Association has created 
National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes. It is 
too soon to tell if this private effort to implement fairness will 
curb potential abuses. 
Only a handful of reported cases have emerged since Gilmer, 
but there is reason to believe that employers will slowly move 
toward increasing their use of arbitration for ADEA and other 
statutory employment discrimination claims. Gilmer coincides 
with a strong private employer movement toward alternative 
dispute resolution. Employers are increasingly looking toward 
in-house dispute resolution schemes that will head off employee 
conflicts long before they reach court. Early intervention 
through ADR is a positive development. Companies often im-
plement a tiered system based on discussing complaints, using 
hot-lines, or conducting peer reviews to identify and resolve 
disputes before they become a cause celebre. At the next level, 
an in-house or outside mediator assists the parties in crafting a 
mutually acceptable resolution. If these in-house and voluntary 
schemes fail, employers turn to arbitration (whether binding or 
non-binding) to hear each side and make findings. lOG This last 
stage leaves open the strongest possibility of unreviewable 
harm to aggrieved employees. 
The movement toward arbitration of statutory employment 
disputes, such as ADEA claims, may impair the non-discrimi-
nation goals of the statutes. For all the reasons noted above, it 
is questionable whether arbitration will be a better forum for 
achieving the public policy of eliminating age discrimination. 
That concern is compounded in the area of waivers. Given the 
strong congressional imprimatur of waivers with retirement 
incentives, it is a small step to conclude that waiver provisions 
will eventually contain standard arbitration clauses for inter-
preting the waiver agreement. Any cases that are not covered 
by the waiver contract could be covered by an employee manual 
or individual employment contract requiring arbitration. In-
creasing reliance on waivers and arbitration is likely to push 
106. See generally Edward Baig, When It's Time to Do Battle With Your Company, 
Bus. WK., Feb. 10, 1997, at 130-31. 
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many legal challenges to retirement incentives behind closed 
doors. 
IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF MOVING RETIREMENT INCENTIVES 
BEHIND CLOSED DOORS 
The increasing use of waivers and the development of man-
datory arbitration of ADEA claims diminish scrutiny of age 
discrimination complaints, particularly in the area of retirement 
incentives. Statutes that provide private rights of action give 
aggrieved individuals the power to choose whether to enforce 
their perceived rights. Like a private attorney general, the law 
is using those individuals (and giving them incentives) to imple-
ment public policy. Allowing private rights of action supple-
ments the underfunded enforcement efforts by the EEOC. That 
shared responsibility is a very rational system of coordinated 
enforcement that gives those with the most incentive (the 
harmed individual)-the power to challenge the employer's deci-
sion.107 But empowering employers to set the conditions for 
resolving statutory employment discrimination disputes, rather 
than regulating that power, is ripe with abuse. To call upon an 
old bromide, the fox is now guarding the chicken coop. 
Gilmer argues that arbitration can further important social 
policies through its remedial and deterrent functions. lOS Even 
assuming that is true, it is less clear whether a "double choice" 
model of privatizing disputes through waiver of both claims and 
forums, as allowed with retirement incentives, can promote the 
ADEA's social policies in this context. If embraced by many 
employers, there will be little deterrence left because we will 
have far fewer enforceable legal limitations to retirement incen-
tives. 
Both waivers of the right to sue for retirement incentives and 
of the right to go to court (substituted by mandatory arbitra-
tion) are superficially the result of "choice." Many eloquent 
commentators have noted the bright and dark sides of choice. 
107. See Judith A. McMorrow, Who Owns Rights: Waiving and Settling Private 
Rights of Action, 34 VILL. L. REv. 429-50 (1989). 
108. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27-28 (1991). 
HeinOnline -- 31 U. Rich. L. Rev. 818 1997
818 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:795 
One higbly problematic aspect of choice is that it selects a 
status quo as a starting point. This has significant practical 
implications and subtle sociological consequences. Both releases 
and arbitration clauses are typically offered on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis by employers. There is seldom equality of bar-
gaining power. While this may strike some as less troublesome 
in the waiver context, where employers are offering a consider-
ation that they need not provide, there is typically no consider-
ation for arbitration clauses. There is seldom meaningful negoti-
ation for employees who receive lower compensation. Class 
distinctions emerge. The choice model also has significant im-
plications for institutionalizing race and gender distinctions. 
We should care that there is less public scrutiny of employer 
retirement incentives. Although employees seem to be embrac-
ing more creative retirement options, it is unclear whether the 
non-discrimination goals are fully achieved when employers can 
shield their retirement incentives from public scrutiny. We also 
do not know whether larger public policy concerns, such as 
encouraging older workers to continue in the work force to 
create an appropriate balance between full-time and retired 
workers, might be eroded by employers' aggressive use of re-
tirement incentives. Certainly, we will have less "percolating" of 
issues in the lower courts. We will have less intermediate anal-
ysis to help us understand what constitutes fair retirement 
incentives that balance the freedom of choice for employees and 
employers and the larger public policy concerns. These are the 
dangers of implementing public policy in private. 
